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ACCELERATION ON TRANSFER PROVISIONSANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION

Mortgage provisions which restrict the transfer of mortgaged
property without the consent of the mortgagee are becoming increasingly common as lenders seek greater protection and higher returns in
times of unstable economic conditions. The technique commonly
employed is to accelerate the mortgage debt at the option of the
mortgagee when the encumbered real estate is transferred or sold. The
exact wording of such provisions may vary according to the preference
of the lender, but their substantive effects are similar. This discussion
will focus on a provision of the recently revised Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation form which is likely to have a significant impact
on the home mortgage industry.' Paragraph 17 of the form provides:
If all of any part of the Property or an interest therein is sold
or transferred by Borrower without Lender's prior consent,
excluding (a) the creation of a lien or encumbrance subordinate to this Mortgage, (b) the creation of a purchase money
security interest for household appliances, (c) a transfer by
devise, descent or by operation of law upon the death of a
joint tenant or (d) the grant of any leasehold interest of three
years or less not containing an option to purchase, Lender
may, at Lender's option, declare all the sums secured by this
Mortgage to be immediately due and payable. Lender shall
have waived such option to accelerate if, prior to the sale or
transfer, Lender and the person to whom the Property is to
be sold or transferred reach agreement in writing that the
credit of such person is satisfactory to Lender and that the
*
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1. The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation form is known as WF Form M-86 11/73.
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interest payable on the sums secured by this Mortgage shall
be at such rate as Lender shall request. If Lender has waived
the option to accelerate provided in this paragraph 17 and if
Borrower's successor in interest has executed a written assumption agreement accepted in writing by Lender, Lender
from all obligations under this Mortshall release Borrower
2
gage and the Note.
By virtue of such a mortgage clause, the restrictions apply to an
ordinary sale or transfer other than one by devise, descent or by
operation of law. Furthermore, on such a sale or transfer, the
mortgagee may accelerate the entire balance due on the mortgage debt
or waive acceleration if the transferee has an acceptable credit rating
and agrees to pay the rate of interest which the mortgagee requests. If
there is such an agreement between the mortgagee and the transferee,
and if the transferee assumes the mortgage, then the mortgagee must
release the borrower from all obligations under the note and mortgage.
An obvious effect of the above provisions, at least in an era of
rising interest rates, is to allow the mortgagee to raise the interest rate
on the outstanding debt whenever the mortgaged property is sold. He
can do this simply by refusing to waive the acceleration provisions,
thereby allowing the entire sum to become due and payable. In this
event, one of several things could happen: (1) The buyer could consummate the sale by using his own funds to satisfy the mortgage debt;
(2) the buyer could consummate the sale by financing a new mortgage
at the higher prevailing rate, incurring the additional financing costs,
and satisfying the existing mortgage debt with the proceeds of the new
loan; (3) the sale could be aborted; or (4) the sale could be consummated with the transferee and transferor unable to pay the accelerated
mortgage debt so that foreclosure would result. It is important to note
that the acceleration clause will be waived only if the mortgagee agrees
that the credit of the buyer or transferee is satisfactory and the transferee agrees to pay the interest rate demanded by the mortgagee. The
mortgagee is free to be entirely arbitrary in refusing to consent to a
proposed sale.
Presumably, in an era of declining interest rates, the mortgagee
would be more willing to consent to the transfer and approve the new
purchaser-owner. During such periods the advantage is still on the side
of the lender, since the mortgagor or buyer has no option to accelerate.
If refinancing is his choice, he must comply with any prepayment
provisions in the mortgage, pay the necessary premiums to the current
mortgagee for that privilege, and also incur the considerable financing
expenditures involved in refinancing.
Until recently, similar mortgage clauses were less stringent from
2. WF Form M-86 11/73, para. 17 (emphasis added) [hereinafter referred to as paragraph
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the mortgagor's viewpoint. A typical clause 3 allowed the transfer to be
made without the consent of the mortgagee, but if the buyer or
transferee refused to assume the mortgage, the mortgagee could accelerate. As long as the transferee assumed the obligations and complied
with all the mortgage terms, the lending institution was not at liberty
to call the loan. The mortgagee was not allowed to increase the interest
rate under this provision simply because there was a transfer of the
property.
Paragraph 17 of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
form is not typical of acceleration clauses heretofore found in
mortgages nor is it likely to be the only such clause in a mortgage since
mortgages customarily permit acceleration of the debt upon breach of
any of the mortgage covenants by the mortgagor. 4 The validity of such
acceleration clauses has been firmly established. "It is competent for
the parties to agree that upon . . . the breach of . . . any condition by
the mortgagors, the mortgagee shall have the option of declaring the
principal debt to be due and proceed to foreclose for the entire sum
due." 5 Thus, the mortgagee has a contract right immediately to receive
the full amount outstanding if the borrower should default.
However, it is also recognized that under certain circumstances a
"court of equity may refuse to foreclose a mortgage when an acceleration of the due date of the debt would be an inequitable or unjust
result and the circumstances would render the acceleration unconscionable. ' 6 Yet, most acceleration clauses will be upheld as the means
by which to protect the mortgagee's interests. The Supreme Court of
Florida has stated:
Such an agreement is not prohibited by statute, nor is it
against public policy; it is not in the nature of a forfeiture nor
3. The following provision was paragraph 17 of a mortgage form used by a federal savings
and loan association, the identity of which is withheld:
If a conveyance should be made by the Mortgagor of the premises herein described, or
any part hereof, and the grantee named in such conveyance fails or refuses to assume the
payment of the obligation evidenced by said promissory notes and secured by this
mortgage, and in accordance with their respective terms, and abide by the rules and
regulations of the Association, including payment of a reasonable transfer fee, then, and
in that event, at the option and upon the demand of the Association all sums of money
secured hereby shall immediately become forthwith due and payable. (Emphasis added.)
4. WF Form M-86 11/73, para. 18, provides:
[Ulpon Borrower's breach of any covenafit or agreement of Borrower in this Mortgage,
including the covenants to pay when due any sums secured by this Mortgage, Lender
prior to acceleration shall mail notice to Borrower specifying: (1) the breach; (2) the
action required to cure such breach; (3) a date, not less than thirty days from the (late
the notice is mailed to Borrower, by which such breach must be cured; and (4) that
failure to cure such breach on or before the (late specified in the notice may result in
acceleration of the sums secured by this Mortgage and sale of the Property. If the breach
is not cured on or before the date specified in the notice, Lender at Lender's option may
declare all of the sums secured by this Mortgage to be immediately due and payable
without further demand and may foreclose this Mortgage by judicial proceeding.
5. Treb Trading Co. v. Green, 102 Fla. 238, 242, 135 So. 510, 511 (1931), quoting Warren
v. Creevey, 87 Fla. 46, 51, 99 So. 247, 248-49 (1924).
6. Campbell v. Werner, 232 So. 2d 252, 256 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), quoting Althouse v.
Kenney, 182 So. 2d 270, 272 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).

COMMENTS

1975]

587

a hard contract which it would be unconscionable to enforce,
because an investor may very properly insist that his security
shall be kept intact or that the loan shall mature. In fact,
such a provision is very analogous to an agreement that a
failure to pay 7 the interest promptly shall render the whole
principal due.
II.

RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION

A.

Generally

Although a mortgage acceleration provision per se may be valid,
the effect of such a provision on the alienability of the encumbered
property must also be considered. For centuries the free alienability of
land has been a favored objective of the common law. Generally, a
mortgagor, as beneficial owner, could do as he wished with his property. He could use the premises in any manner as long as he did
nothing to destroy or impair the mortgagee's security interest. This
freedom of action included the power to sell and convey his interests
without interference. 8 A transfer of mortgaged land normally did not
prejudice the rights of the lender because the transferor or original
mortgagor remained liable on the debt, and the grantee took subject to
the encumbrance. 9
Paragraph 17 obviously restricts this freedom of alienation enjoyed by the mortgagor. In order to determine the probable validity of
this restriction, it is necessary first to review the law regarding restraints on alienation; second, to examine judicial decisions construing
similar clauses; and third, to assess the overall effect on alienation of
the provisions in issue.
A restraint on alienation refers not only to direct restrictions on
the legal power to alienate, but also to provisions that restrict alienation as a practical matter. "Any provision in a deed, will, contract, or
other legal instrument which, if valid, would tend to impair the
marketability of property, is a restraint on alienation."' 0 Restraints
may be classified as direct or indirect:
A direct restraint on alienation is a provision in a deed, or
will . . . which, by its express terms, or by implication of

fact, purports to prohibit or penalize the exercise of the
power of alienation .

.

.

An indirect restraint . . . arises

when an attempt is made to accomplish some purpose other
than the restraint of alienability, but with the incidental
7. Treb Trading Co. v. Green, 102 Fla. 238, 242-43, 135 So. 510, 512 (1931).
8. G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES §§ 247-48 (2d ed. 1970),

9. See 59 C.J.S. Rights of Mortgagor in General § 308 and Sale or Lease of Premises § 309
(1949); G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES § 247 (2d ed. 1970).
10. L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § IlI1, at 4 (2d ed. 1956).
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result that the instrument, if valid, would restrain practical
alienability. 11
A mortgage contract itself may be classified as an indirect restraint because it gives rise to a divided title in the property and
thereby invariably restrains a free and practical transfer. 12 A provision
such as paragraph 17 is at least an indirect restraint on alienation
because it does impede the transfer of mortgaged property. Is it also a
direct restraint? The essential terms are that if there is a non-exempt
transfer of the mortgaged property, the mortgage debt shall be accelerated unless the lender has waived such provision by approving the
transferee and agreeing with him on the interest rate that the transferee will pay. Thus, there is no blanket prohibition against the transfer of the mortgaged property, only an acceleration of the debt if a
transfer is made without the prior consent of the mortgagee. But,
insofar as it penalizes such a transfer by imposing an acceleration of
the mortgage debt, it does indeed fall within the definition of a direct
restraint. 13 Further, considering the importance of mortgage financing
in real estate transactions, the effect of paragraph 17 in many instances
might well be the same as if it stated, "[n]6 sale or non-exempt transfer
shall take place without the prior written consent of the mortgagee or
lender." It is submitted that a blanket provision such as this would be
clearly void under principles to be developed below.
The prohibition of a sale without the consent of a third party is a
type of disabling restraint, 14 since it attempts to remove the feature of
alienability . unless the third party consents thereto. Disabling restraints, except in the case of equitable interests under spendthrift
trusts, are commonly held void. Is Forfeiture 16 and promissory* restraints17 on life estates and estates for years are generally upheld; 18
whereas similar restraints on fees simple are usually invalidated. 19
Unlimited direct restraints on fees simple are generally held void;20
however, some courts do allow direct or indirect restraints for a
11. Id. § 1112, at 4, 5.
12. Id. § 1201, at 88.
13. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
14. A disabling restraint exists when property is conveyed or devised with a direction
that it shall not be alienated. . . . and if valid, it would operate to remove the power of
alienation as a characteristic of the estate granted.
L. SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1131 (2d ed. 1956).
15. L. SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS § 113 (2d ed. 1966).

16. A forfeiture restraint exists when, by the terms of an instrument of transfer, the estate
transferred will be subject to forfeiture on alienation. L. SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS § 112 (2d ed.
1966).
17. A promissory restraint refers to a covenant in an instrument of conveyance, or to a
contract, in which the promisor agrees not to alienate the property. Id.
18. Id. at §§ 115, 116.
19. Id. at § 114.

20. Roemhild v. Jones, 239 F.2d 492, 496 (8th Cir. 1957) (upholding the validity of a
particular repurchase option).
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limited time if such restrictions are reasonable and do not violate the
rule against perpetuities. 2 One court has stated:
In many jurisdictions restraints on alienation are not invalid
as against public policy if they are reasonable although they
will not be upheld unless they serve a legal and useful purpose, or unless positive law or public policy demands it.
Where restraints are not ipso facto void, whether a substantial restraint on alienation is valid depends on the particular circumstances; and the public policy against restraints
on alienation may be relaxed where the circumstances convince the court that it is a reasonable means of accomplishing
a purpose recognized as proper .... 22
Some states permit reasonable restraints upon alienation if they
are legitimately designed to attain some accepted social or economic
end. Thus, a court must analyze such restraints to determine their
validity. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
has indicated what should be considered when making such an
analysis:
[T]he crucial inquiry should be directed at the utility of the
restraint as compared with the injurious consequences that
will flow from its enforcement. If accepted social and
economic considerations dictate that a partial restraint is
reasonably necessary for their fulfillment, such a restraint
should be sustained. No restraint should be sustained simply
because it is limited in time, or the class of persons excluded
is not total, or all modes of alienation are not prohibited.
These qualifications lessen the degree to which restraints
violate general public policy against restraining alienation of
property and should be considered to that extent; but they are
not, in themselves, sufficient to overcome it. In short, the law
of property, like other areas of the law, is not a mathematical
science but takes shape at the direction of social and
economic forces in an ever changing society, and decisions
should be made to turn on these considerations. 2 3
The court indicates that in dealing with restraints on alienation, it is
more concerned with practical rather than theoretical considerations.
It is necessary to weigh the beneficial characteristics of the restraint
against the extent to which alienability would be hindered. Thus, in
relation to paragraph 17, one must compare the advantages to the
21. Id.

22. Id. at 496-97, quoting 73 C.J.S. Property § 13b (1951).
23. Mowatt v. 1540 Lake Shore Drive Corp., 385 F.2d 135, 136 (7th Cir. 1967), quoting
Gale v. York Center Community Cooperative, Inc., 21 I11.
2d 86, 92-93, 171 N.E.2d 30, 33
(1960). The court in Mowatt upheld the restriction on assignment of a cooperative apartment
lease without consent of the lessor-corporation after reading into the provision the requirement of
"reasonable exercise."
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lender with the detriment to the borrower should he desire to sell his
property subject to a mortgage.
B.

Judicial Interpretation of Provisions for
Acceleration on Sale
Although certain restraints on alienation have been upheld for
many years, 2 4 clauses such as paragraph 17 are relatively new and
cases construing similar provisions are limited. The few courts which
have been faced with problems of mortgage acceleration on transfer
without consent are in conflict as to the enforceability of the clauses.
Some courts have been able to render a decision on similar provisions
without actually determining the validity of the limitation.
In Home Federal Savings and Loan Association v. English, 5 a
mortgage clause provided that if a conveyance were made without the
written consent of the mortgagee and without assumption by the
grantee, the mortgagee would have the option to call the loan. The
court avoided the question as to whether the clause was valid or
invalid, and refused foreclosure and acceleration because it was necessary for both conditions to occur. There was no written consent to the
sale but there was an assumption by the purchaser; and thus the court
was able to avoid a 'legality' ruling since the clause said "and" instead
of "or."
In an Arkansas case, z6 a mortgagee brought an action against
the mortgagor, his father and subsequent purchasers for judgment
in the amount of the indebtedness due because the mortgagor had
sold the premises without written consent of the mortgagee. The Supreme Court of Arkansas accepted the validity of a clause similar to
paragraph 17 but held that it could not be enforced without the lender
fulfilling an implied obligation to justify its refusal to consent to the sale to
a particular purchaser. 27 The lender was thus not able to accelerate and
foreclose on the property without justification. In the opinion, the court
analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of clauses which accelerate
the debt should a mortgagor sell all or part of the premises without
written consent of the mortgagee:
[W]e can certainly see why a mortgagee would object to some
transfers; a mortgagor, if permitted, could sell his equity in
property and transfer the indebtedness to a person who had
been convicted of operating a bawdy house . . . a gambling
house, or illegally selling whiskey or drugs . . . [or] an

individual who persistently had failed to pay his obligations,
24. See L. SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 1115, 1117, 1131, 1135,
1168 (2d ed. 1956).
25. 249 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
26. Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 481 S.W.2d 725 (Ark. 1972).
27. Id.
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who was without a job, or who had a record of permitting
property to deteriorate.
On the other hand . . . a mortgagor could be transferred
from his job ... he could be in the position of being forced to
sell to someone at great sacrifice . . . . The validity of such a

requirement would leave a mortgagor much at the mercy of
the mortgagee . . . [and we agree] that there must be legiti-

mate grounds for refusal to accept or transfer to a particular
individual or concern. "I
The Arkansas court specifically held that the mortgagee did not
have valid business reasons for withholding its consent and must therefore accept the transfer. So, despite the clause itself being valid, the
court refused to enforce it on the facts of this case. The dissenting
judge felt it was not
for us or any judicial tribunal to pass on the business judgment
of those whose experience gives them insight into such matters,
so long as there are factors that require a choice between alternatives which are dependent upon the exercise of that judgment
are any reasons that would support the choice
and there
29
made.

Other courts have used the business objective test to sustain
similar clauses. In People's Savings Association v. Standard Industries, Inc., 3 0 the court felt that the mortgagee had a right to protect its
security interest by maintaining control over the identity and financial
capabilities of the purchaser. This was therefore a legitimate business
objective and mortgage provisions designed to attain it would not be
illegal, inequitable or contrary to public policy.
In Mutual Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Wisconsin
Wire Works, 3 1 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that a provision
in a mortgage whereby the balance would become due if the mortgagor
conveyed the premises without the consent of the mortgagee was not
against public policy. However, the court qualified its holding by
stating that enforcement depended upon the facts of each particular
case and whether the invocation of the clause would be inequitable
under the circumstances. This case is basically in accord with the
Arkansas decision, in that a case by case analysis of the circumstances
should be used to determine the equities of enforcing a clause such as
paragraph 17.
The Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District, held that
the mortgagees were not entitled to foreclose because of noncompliance
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 729 (emphasis added).
Id. at 737 (Fogleman, J., dissentirg).
22 Ohio App. 2d 35, 257 N.E.2d 406 (1970).
58 Wis. 2d 99, 205 N.W.2d 762 (1973).
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with a mortgage provision requiring consent before conveying, so long
as no harm resulted to the mortgagees from such conveyance. 3 z The
lenders claimed there was a breach of the mortgage contract when the
transfer of title to the mortgaged property was made without their
approval. Because of this breach, the acceleration clause was activated
and the mortgagees claimed they were entitled to full payment. However, they did not allege any other breach nor did they allege "that the
security had been impaired by the default, or that they had disapproved the transfer of ownership of the mortgaged property, or that
they had not had opportunity to pass on the credit of the successor in
ownership. '33 The court stated that a court of equity may refuse to
foreclose any mortgage if an acceleration would be unconscionable and
the result would be unjust and inequitable. A court has the power to
relieve a mortgagor from an acceleration clause where a default is the
result of an unreasonable or unconscionable act of the mortgagee, or
where the default causes no harm to the security and it would therefore be unjust to foreclose. 3 4 In order for the mortgagees to have
prevailed, this Florida court would have required evidence of harm to
the security. Courts generally do not speculate as to what might
happen to the secured interest in the future. Thus, the clause in this
case was held inequitable and unjust, and foreclosure was denied. In a
subsequent suit on a promissory note, the same district court of appeal
held that the note, secured by a mortgage containing an acceleration
clause conditioned on the sale of the property, can be accelerated upon
the sale of the property. The court did not apply equitable principles to
nullify the clause and left open the question of whether upon the sale
of the property, the mortgage can be accelerated and foreclosed without a showing of prejudice to the mortgagee by reason of the con35
veyance.
In Malouff v. Midland Federal Savings and Loan Association,3 6
the Supreme Court of Colorado reversed a lower court decision and
held that a "due on sale" clause in a deed of trust which permitted the
lender, after sale of property securing a loan, to accelerate whether or
not any default existed, was a reasonable restraint on alienation. The
court also found that it was not unreasonable for a lender to impose a
higher interest rate on one who buys property subject to a mortgage as
a condition for not invoking the acceleration clause. The decision
discussed the fact that it is a
justifiable interest of the lender to protect itself against a rise
in the interest rate and to permit an acceleration of the
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Clark v. Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
Id. at 584.
Id. at 584-85.
Stockman v. Burke, 305 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
Colo. -, 509 P.2d 1240 (1973).

COMMENTS

1975]

indebtedness on sale where the purchaser will not agree to
pay an increased interest rate on assumption of the loan ....
When interest rates are high, a lender runs the risk they
will drop and that the borrower will refinance his debt
elsewhere at a lower rate and pay off the loan, leaving the
lender with money to loan but at a less favorable interest
rate. On the other hand, when money is loaned at low
interest, the lender risks losing the benefit of a later increase
in rates. As one protection against the foregoing contingency,
a due-on-sale clause . . . is merely one example
of ways taken
sensible lenders. 37

to minimize risks by

Thus, the court did not feel that the efforts of the bank in trying to
protect itself from the effects of inflationary economic conditions were
illegal or improper. Since there was no effort to extract an excessive
interest rate from the new purchaser, the clause was not inequitable or
unconscionable and foreclosure could validly be made.
III.

SUMMATION AND CRITIQUE

A brief summation of the cases involving mortgages with provisions similar to the one under discussion reveals that they have
employed different techniques and reached different results: (1) A
doctrine of strict construction so that if all the conditions for acceleration are not met, acceleration will not be permitted; 3 8 (2) a requirement
that the mortgagee justify his refusal to consent to the purchase; in the
absence of which acceleration will not be permitted; 39 (3) a willingness
to permit acceleration on the general principle that the mortgagee has
a right to protect the security, unless acceleration would be inequitable
under the circumstances;4" (4) a refusal to permit acceleration if no
harm to the mortgagee would result from the transfer; 4 1 and (5) an
approval of the entire scheme on the basis that it is a reasonable
business practice and thus not an unreasonable restraint on aliena42
tion.
Considering paragraph 17 as restraint on alienation, it seems clear
that it should not be invalidated as a direct disabling restraint because
the provision does not preclude transfer without the mortgagee's consent. It permits transfer, but provides that on such an occurrence the
mortgagee may accelerate the debt. As previously mentioned, how37.

-_Colo. at-__, 509 P.2d at 1244, citing Cherry v. Home Sav. &Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App.

2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (2d Dist. 1969).

38. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
39. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.

40. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
41. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
42. See notes 30 and 36 supra and accompanying text.
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ever, it has an indirect but significant effect on alienation 43 and thus
should be evaluated in that light.
The reasonableness of the restraint may well become a critical
factor in a determination of its validity. This then would seem to
require a balancing of the benefits to be derived from such provisions
against the detriments to the borrower and adverse effects on alienability. As to the scope of the restraint, it is to be noted that it does not
apply to transfers by devise, descent or by operation of law, the
creation of subordinate encumbrances or the creation of short term
leaseholds without an option to purchase. Of these exceptions, the
most significant relates to transfers by devise, descent and operation of
law. If the provisions were to apply to such transfers, the burden and
risk on the mortgagor would be exceedingly great. A further concession is given to the mortgagor in that he will be released if the
mortgagee has waived the option to accelerate and the purchaser has
assumed in writing the mortgage obligations.
From the mortgagee's viewpoint, the lender gets greater protection of his security by the ability to approve or veto a prospective
purchaser of the property. In addition, he obtains a tremendous financial advantage under the clause in question. By otherwise refusing to
consent to the transfer, the mortgagee can collect greater revenues
either by an adjustment of the interest rate or by means of an agreement whereby for a certain sum, the original rate of interest would
remain the same. Thus, if the prevailing interest rate rises, the lending
institution can bring the former rate into harmony with present values.
If the prevailing interest rate falls, the mortgagee will naturally choose
to leave the rate at the status quo.
Additionally, lending institutions assert that the new provisions
serve a public need in supplying loan funds. Their contention is that
uniform mortgage contracts with flexible provisions, such as paragraph 17 and its added safety factor with respect to the security,
facilitate the transfer of mortgages between lenders in various parts of
the country. Thus, cash can more readily flow from areas with a
surplus of funds to areas with an abundance of borrowers and a
shortage of cash.
43. In this regard statutory and judicial expressions of public policy may be helpful. For
example, a section of the Florida statutes provides that
reverter or forfeiture provisions of unlimited duration in the conveyance of real estate or
any interest therein in the state constitute an unreasonable restraint on alienation and
are contrary to the public policy of the state.
FLA. STAT. § 689.18(1) (1973).

The statute then goes on to limit the duration of certain possibilities of reverter and rights of
re-entry to a period of 21 years. It is an accepted principle that certain types of future interests are
invalid as constituting unreasonable restraints on alienation. The Rule Against Perpetuities is a
classic example. Thus, by analogy, it could be argued that mortgage provisions such as paragraph 17 have such an adverse effect on alienation as to constitute an unreasonable restraint.

This would be particularly so if no requirement of reasonableness or justification were imposed
on the mortgagee's discretion either to approve of the transfer or to accelerate the indebtedness.
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From the borrower's viewpoint, if the owner wishes to sell his
mortgaged property, he is in most instances at the mercy of the lender.
If the lender is unwilling to approve the transferee or to allow an
assumption without a large fee or an increase in the rate of interest,
there may be no sale. Many prospective buyers may decline when
faced with the prospect of having to pay an additional fee and/or
increased interest rates. Is not this arbitrary power of the mortgagee
over the sale of the mortgagor's property an unreasonable restraint on
alienation? Further, is there a genuine need for such power to be
vested in the mortgagee when in any event (assuming no novation), he
would have recourse against the original borrower on the note and
against the land in the hands of the transferee?
The device of paragraph 17 may be essentially an indirect, way of
increasing the return to the lender in an era of rising interest rates. If
so, would not a note with a variable interest rate be a more honest and
direct method of achieving the same result? Further, such a direct
approach could be even more beneficial to the lender since the rate
could be adjusted periodically whether or not there is a conveyance of
the land. However, the variable interest rate mortgage has not proved
popular in this country. Perhaps the reason is that each side of the
transaction is unwilling to bear the risk that the interest rate will move
in the wrong direction.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Provisions such as paragraph 17 are apt to become more and more
prevalent; with such increased use, it is reasonable to expect an increased number of controversies and litigation. The provision invites
litigation, particularly if the borrower-mortgagor is not fully apprised
of the meaning and subtlety of the clause at the time he executes the
mortgage. 44 One solution would be for the legislature to take a stand
on the validity of such provisions, or to prescribe standards by which
permissible mortgage terms may be distinguished from those which are
impermissible. In this consumer-oriented era, such a development is
not entirely unexpected.
In the absence of legislative action or an authoritative supreme
court decision, however, it would appear that uncertainty best d&scribes the status of such clauses. As to the acceleration feature itself,
the courts may avoid the point entirely by ascertaining that under the
particular facts of a case, acceleration would be inequitable, and thus
44. The imposition of a duty on the lender to disclose fully the meaning of this and the many
other fine print mortgage clauses would not be an unreasonable obligation in our consumeroriented society. At the time of the loan application, it could be required by statute or appropriate
regulation that a copy of the proposed mortgage in addition to an explanation of its essential
terms be supplied the borrower. In this way, he would have an opportunity to consider their
impact and to seek intelligent legal advice instead of being confronted with the lengthy document
for the first time at the closing.
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refuse to enforce it. The provision appears valid insofar as the rule
prohibiting direct restraints on alienation is concerned, since acceleration of the mortgage debt technically does not prohibit alienation. As
to whether it should be held invalid as an unreasonable indirect
restraint on alienation, a factual survey as to whether such provisions
do in fact adversely affect sales of land would be most interesting
albeit unique. 4 5 Considering the importance of financing in real estate
transactions, it certainly seems logical, especially in times of rising
interest rates, that the possibility of losing a favorable existing
mortgage would make sales more difficult. Thus, at least as to individual homeowners, 46 it is believed that such provisions should be
held invalid as unreasonable restraints not essential for the protection
47
of mortgagees.
In the absence of factual marketing data as to whether or not
these provisions do in fact substantially affect sales and transfers, a
court can only base its judgment on the experiences of the judges. In
the meantime, it seems reasonable to assume that such clauses will
become increasingly common and "accelerate the tribulations of the
borrower.:'
45. The authors are unaware of any empirical study or accumulation of market data used as
a justification, for example, of applying the Rule Against Perpetuities in invalidating remote
contingent future interests. It is simply assumed that such interests do in fact impede marketability.
46. Developers of large projects and commercial entrepreneurs will generally have sufficient
sophistication, expert legal and financial advice and adequate borrowing power to appraise

intelligently and negotiate acceptable terms of mortgage financing.
47. The mortgagees still have a security interest in the land and a claim for the debt against
the original mortgagor.

